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THE RISE AND FALL OF EMPLOYER
SANCTIONS*
David Bacon & Bill Ong Hing**
ABSTRACT
Workplace raids by gun-wielding Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment (ICE) agents that resulted in the mass arrests of dozens and some-
times hundreds of employees have ceased under the Obama administration.
But "silent raids," or audits of companies' records by federal agents, that
replaced them have resulted in the firing of thousands of undocumented
workers. The administration defends these "softer, gentler" operations, yet
the result is the same: workers who are here to support their families are
out of work.
In this essay, David Bacon and Bill Ong Hing argue that ICE raids-be
they of the Bush or the Obama kind-should cease. The basis for these op-
erations-employer sanctions-should be repealed, and true reform that
recognizes the rights of all workers should be enacted.
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INTRODUCTION
Ana Contreras would have been a competitor for the national tai kwon
do championship team in 2009. She was fourteen years old. For six years
she went to practice instead of birthday parties, giving up the friendships
* © Copyright by David Bacon and Bill Ong Hing
- David Bacon, Associate Editor, Pacific News Service; Bill Ong Hing, Professor of Law,
University of San Francisco.
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most teenagers live for. Then in October 2009, disaster struck. Her mother
Dolores lost her job. The money for classes was gone, and not just that. "I
only bought clothes for her once a year, when my tax refund check came,"
Dolores Contreras explains. She continues:
Now she needs shoes, and I had to tell her we didn't have any money. I
stopped the cable and the internet she needs for school. When my cell
phone contract is up next month, I'll stop that too. I've never had enough
money for a car, and now we've gone three months without paying the
light bill.'
Dolores Contreras shared her misery with eighteen hundred other fami-
lies. All lost their jobs when their employer, American Apparel, fired them
for lacking immigration status. For months she carried around the letter
from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), handed to her by the
company lawyer. It says the documents she provided when she was hired
were no good, and without work authorization, her work life was over.2
Of course, it was not really over. Contreras still had to keep working if
she and her daughter were to eat and pay rent. So instead of a job that
barely paid her bills, she was forced to find another one that would not
even do that.
Contreras is a skilled sewing machine operator. She came to the United
States thirteen years earlier, after working many years in the garment facto-
ries of Tehuacan, Puebla, Mexico. There, companies like Levis make so
many pairs of stonewashed jeans that rumor has it the town's water has
turned blue. In Los Angeles, Contreras hoped to find the money to send
home for her sister's weekly dialysis treatments, and to pay the living and
school expenses for four other siblings. For five years she moved from
shop to shop. Like most garment workers, she did not get paid for over-
time, her paychecks were often short, and sometimes her employer disap-
peared overnight, owing weeks in back pay.
Finally Contreras got a job at American Apparel, famous for its sexy
clothing, made in Los Angeles instead of overseas.3 She still had to work
like a demon. Her team of ten experienced seamstresses turned out thirty
dozen tee shirts an hour. After dividing the piece rate evenly among them,
she would come home with $400 for a four-day week, after taxes. She paid
1. Interview with "Dolores Contreras" (name changed for this article), in L.A., Cal.
(Dec. 15, 2009).
2. Id.
3. Jim Straub, Who's Your Daddy, CLAMOR MAG., Fall 2006, available at http://clamor
magazine.org/issues/38/aa/straub.php.
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Social Security too, although she will never see a dime in benefits because
her contributions were credited to an invented number.4
Now Contreras is working again in a sweatshop at half what she earned
before. Meanwhile, American Apparel took steps to replace those who
were fired.5 Contreras says they are mostly older women with documents,
who cannot work as fast. "Maybe they sew 10 dozen a day apiece," she
claims. "The only operators with papers are the older ones." Younger,
faster workers either have no papers, or if they have them, they find better-
paying jobs doing something easier. "President Obama is responsible for
putting us in this situation," she charges angrily. "This is worse than an
immigration raid. They want to keep us from working at all."6
Contreras is right. The White House website says, "President Obama
will remove incentives to enter the country illegally by preventing employ-
ers from hiring undocumented workers and enforcing the law."7 In June
2009, he told Congress members that the government will be "cracking
down on employers who are using illegal workers in order to drive down
wages-and oftentimes mistreat those workers."
8
The law Obama is enforcing is the 1986 Immigration Reform and Con-
trol Act, 9 which requires employers to keep records of workers' immigra-
tion status, and prohibits them from "knowingly hiring" those who have no
legal documents, or "work authorization."'10 In effect, the law made it a
crime for undocumented immigrants to work. This provision, employer
sanctions, is the legal basis for all the workplace immigration raids and en-
forcement for a quarter century and now for Obama's auditing of employ-
ment records. The end result is the same: workers lose their jobs. Sanc-
tions pretend to punish employers, but in reality, they punish workers.
I. OBAMA'S INTERIOR ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY
Workplace Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) raids by gun-
wielding agents resulting in the mass arrests of dozens and sometimes hun-
dreds of employees that were common under the George W. Bush adminis-
4. Interview with "Dolores Contreras," supra note 1.
5. Id. Letters were sent to suspected undocumented workers. Id.
6. Id.
7. See Immigration, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/immigration
(last visited Sept. 27, 2010).
8. Katherine Brandon, Working Together for Immigration Reform, THE WHITE HOUSE
BLOG (June 25, 2009, 6:45 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/issues/Immigration.html.
9. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a et seq.).
10. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2005).
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tration appear to have ceased under the Obama administration." Legally
questionable mass arrests continue to occur in neighborhoods under the
pretext of serving warrants on criminal aliens. 12  However, disruptive,
high-profile worksite raids appear to have subsided. When a Bush admin-
istration-style ICE raid took place in Washington State in February 2009
soon after Janet Napolitano took the helm as Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), she expressed surprise and ordered an inves-
tigation. These types of raids were not in her strategy plan she noted; in-
stead enforcement in her regime would focus on employers who hire undo-
cumented workers, not on the workers themselves.' 3
Make no mistake, although deportations related to worksite operations
may have decreased under the Obama approach in contrast with that under
George W. Bush, actual deportation numbers are not down. According to
the Washington Post, the Obama administration is deporting record num-
bers of undocumented immigrants, with ICE expecting to remove about
400,000 individuals in 2010.14 The total is nearly ten percent above the
Bush administration's 2008 sum and twenty-five percent more than were
deported in 2007.15 According to ICE, the increase has been partly a result
of deporting those persons picked up for other crimes and expanding the
search through prisons and jails for deportable immigrants already in cus-
tody.16 "Unlike the former worksite raids that led to arrests and deporta-
tion, the 'silent raids,' or audits of companies' records by federal agents,
usually result in firings."' 7 "Just 765 undocumented workers have been ar-
rested at their jobs in 2010 through early summer, compared with 5,100 in
2008, according to Department of Homeland Security figures."' 8
However, as we see from the Contreras family's plight, the Obama ad-
ministration's focus-on-employers-rather-than-workers strategy in fact falls
squarely on the shoulders of the workers. Immigration raids at factories
and farms have been replaced with a quieter enforcement strategy: sending
11. See generally, Bill Ong Hing, Institutional Racism, ICE Raids, and Immigration
Reform, 44 USF L. REv. 307 (2009).
12. See Interview with Violeta Chapin, Professor of Law, Univ. of Colo., in Santa Fe,
N.M. (Sept. 24, 2010).
13. Secretary Seeks Review of Immigration Raid, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2009, at A19,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/26/washington26immig.html.
14. Peter Slevin, Deportation of Illegal Immigrants Increases Under Obama Adminis-
tration, WASH. POST, July 26, 2010, at A01.
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. Roy Maurer, Undocumented Workers Fired, Firms Audited in 'Silent Raids,' Soc'Y
FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MGMT. (July 22, 2010), http://www.shrm.org/hrdisciplines/global/
Articles/Pages/SilentRaids.aspx.
18. Id.
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federal agents to scour companies' records for undocumented immigrant
workers. "While the sweeps of the past commonly led to the deportation of
such workers, the 'silent raids,' as employers call the audits, usually result
in the workers being fired, although in many cases they are not deported."19
The idea is that if the workers cannot work, they will self-deport, leaving
on their own. However, they actually do not leave because they need to
work. They become more desperate and take jobs at lower wages.2° Given
the increasing scale of enforcement, this can lead to an overall reduction in
the average wage level for millions of workers, which is, in effect, a subsi-
dy to employers. Over a twelve-month period, ICE conducted audits of
employee files at more than 2900 companies. 21  "The agency levied a
record $3 million in civil fines [in the first six months of 2010] on busi-
nesses that hired unauthorized immigrants, according to official figures. "22
Thousands of workers were fired.23
Employers say the audits reach more companies than the work-site
roundups of the Bush administration. The audits force businesses to fire
every suspected undocumented worker on the payroll-not just those who
happened to be on duty at the time of a raid-and make it much harder to
hire other unauthorized workers as replacements. Auditing is effective in
getting unauthorized workers fired for sure.
24
Consider other examples. An audit of Gebbers Farms in the orchard
town of Brewster, Washington yielded results that were similar to what
happened at American Apparel. Immigration inspectors scoured the
records of Gebbers Farms and found evidence that approximately 550 of its
workers, mostly immigrants from Mexico, did not have proper documenta-
tion.25 So, those workers were fired.26 ICE officials also pressured one of
San Francisco's major building service companies, ABM, into firing hun-
dreds of its own workers last spring.27 ICE agents told ABM that they had
19. Julia Preston, Illegal Workers Swept from Jobs in "Silent Raids," N.Y. TIMES, July,
9, 2010, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/l0/us/lOenforce.html.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See Melissa Sanchez, Massive Firings in Brewster, and a Big Debate about Illegal
Immigration, SEATrLE TIMEs, Feb. 13, 2010, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/htm/local
news/2011069760_brewster 14.html.
26. Id.
27. Lauren Smiley, Janitors Descend From Skyscrapers to Protest Immigration Raids,
SFWEEKLY BLOG (Apr. 27, 2010, 5:59 PM), http://blogs.sfweekly.com/thesnitch/2010/04/
janitors descend from skyscrap.php.
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flagged the personnel records of those workers. 28 Weeks earlier, the agents
sifted through Social Security records and the 1-9 immigration forms all
workers have to fill out when they apply for jobs.29 They then told ABM
that the company had to fire 475 workers who were accused of lacking le-
gal immigration status.3" Similar ICE actions resulted in the firing of 1200
ABM janitors in Minneapolis, and 100 janitors in Seattle in the Fall of
2009.31
Echoing President Obama's theme of focusing on employers who use
undocumented workers to "drive down wages" and "mistreat" workers,
ICE chief John Morton says the agency is looking primarily for "'egregious
employers' who commit both labor abuses and immigration violations. '32
But American Apparel, ABM, and Gebbers Farms do not appear to fit that
profile.
While American Apparel is a huge corporation that makes hundreds of
millions of dollars a year, the workers dismissed were "long-term em-
ployees being paid decent wages., 33  "The company is proud of their
'Made in America' labels" and had a reputation for paying more than most
garment shops.34 Before the audit, its CEO, Dov Chamey, took to the
streets and stood shoulder to shoulder with workers in protesting and de-
manding legalization for workers who have been "victimized by our broken
immigration system." 35
Similarly, Gebbers Farms had a general reputation for "doing right by
their employees." 36 "It built housing and soccer fields for its workers and,
unlike many other growers, provides stable year-round work.- 37 "After the
firings, Gebbers Farms advertised hundreds of jobs for orchard workers.
But there were few takers in the state."38 Finally, the employer applied to
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See Lornet Turnbull, Illegal Workers Quietly Let Go, SEATTLE TIMEs, Nov. 23,
2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2010333876 firedjanitors23m.html;
Sasha Aslanian, 1,200 Janitors Fired in 'Quiet' Immigration Raid, MINNESOTA PUBLIC RA-
DIO (Nov. 9, 2009), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2009/11/09/immigrants-
fired/.
32. Preston, supra note 19.
33. Ben Johnson, Crackdown on American Apparel Workers Another Wasted Effort,
ALTERNET.ORG (Oct. 6, 2009), http://www.altemet.org/immigration/143116/crackdown-on_
americanapparelworkersanotherwastedeffort/.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Preston, supra note 19.
37. Sanchez, supra note 25.
38. Preston, supra note 19.
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the federal guest worker program to import about 1200 legal temporary
workers - most from Mexico. 39 "The guest workers, who can stay for up to
six months, also included about 300 from Jamaica."4° This was an imple-
mentation of the Chertoff strategy, "open the front door and you shut the
back door."4' The unspoken rationale for the audits is revealed-force em-
ployers to use guest worker programs.
As for ABM, the building service has been a union company for dec-
ades, and many of the workers had been there for years. According to Olga
Miranda, President of Service Employees Local 87: "They've been work-
ing in the buildings downtown for fifteen, twenty, some as many as twenty-
seven years. They've built homes. They've provided for their families.
They've sent their kids to college. They're not new workers. They didn't
just get here a year ago. ' ' 2
The audit-and-fire strategy was initiated early in the Obama administra-
tion. For example, in May 2009, 254 workers at Overhill Farms in Los
Angeles were fired under similar circumstances. 43 The company, with over
800 employees, was audited by the Internal Revenue Service earlier that
year.44 According to John Grant, Packinghouse Division Director for Local
770 of the United Food and Commercial Workers, which represents pro-
duction employees at the food processing plant, "they found discrepancies
in the Social Security numbers of mapy workers. Overhill then sent a let-
ter ... to 254 people-all members of our union-giving them thirty days
to reconcile their numbers. ' 45
On May 2, the company stopped the production lines and sent everyone
home, saying, there would be no work until "they called us to come
back.",46 For 254 people that call never came. According to a spokesman
for Overhill Farms, "the company was required by federal law to terminate
these employees because they had invalid Social Security numbers. To do
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. See Michael Chertoff, Remarks at University of Southern California National Center
for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (Aug. 13, 2008), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/sp_1219162986509.shtm.
42. Interview with Olga Miranda, President, Service Employees Local 87, in S.F., Cal.,
(May 3, 2010).
43. See Tiffany Ten Eyck, Immigration Reform: What's Labor Up To?, LABOR NoTEs
(June 5, 2009), http://labomotes.org/node/23 10.
44. See id.
45. Interview with John Grant, Packinghouse Div. Dir., United Food and Commercial
Workers Local 770, in L.A., Cal. (Dec. 15, 2009).
46. Interview with Isela Hernandez, in L.A., Cal. (Dec. 10, 2009).
2010]
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otherwise would have exposed both the employees and the company to
criminal and civil prosecution." 47
II. BACKGROUND ON EMPLOYER SANCTIONS
The softer, gentler approach to employer sanctions enforcement imple-
mented by the Obama administration may appear more humane on the sur-
face. After all, auditing and firing is accomplished without guns, hand-
cuffs, or detention. However, the result-loss of work-is not necessarily
softer or gentler for the thousands of fired workers who have been working
to support their families.
Employer sanctions are of relative recent vintage in the nation's immi-
gration laws. In the climate of heightened concerns over the number of un-
documented workers (predominantly Mexican) in the United States in the
1970's and early 1980's, estimates of up to nine million undocumented
people residing in the country were offered to demonstrate that immigra-
tion enforcement efforts were ineffectual.4 8 Policymakers proposed ad-
dressing the situation from a new angle-by penalizing employers who
were hiring undocumented workers, through what came to be called "em-
ployer sanctions."49 "By 1986, employer sanctions had become part of the
nation's immigration laws. The passage of the Immigration Reform and
Control Act (IRCA) represented the culmination of years of social, politi-
cal, and congressional debate about the perceived lack of control over the
U.S. southern border." 50 "The belief that something had to be done about
the large numbers of undocumented workers who had entered the United
States from Mexico in the 1970s was reinforced by the flood of Central
Americans who began to arrive in the early 1980s. ' '51 While the political
turmoil of civil war in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua drove many
Central Americans from their homeland, they, along with the Mexicans
who continued to arrive, were generally labeled "economic migrants" by
47. Interview with Alex Auerbach, Director, Overhill Farms, in L.A., Cal. (Dec. 10,
2009).
48. Bill Ong Hing, The Immigration and Naturalization Service, Community-Based Or-
ganizations, and the Legalization Experience: Lessons for the Self-Help Immigration Phe-
nomenon, 6 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 413, 470 (1992) [hereinafter Hing, Lessons for the Self-
Help].
49. BILL ONG HING, DEFINING AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY 179-82, 196-97(2004).
50. Id. at 155.
51. Id.
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the Reagan administration, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and
the courts. 5
2
The idea of employer sanctions was not new.
In 1952-when the immigration laws were overhauled to clamp down on
subversives and Communists-a provision outlawing willful importation,
transportation, or harboring of undocumented aliens was debated; one
amendment proposed imposing criminal penalties for the employment of
undocumented aliens if the employer had "reasonable grounds to believe
a worker was not legally in the United States."
53
Not only was the amendment soundly defeated, but the following language
was added to the final legislation: "for the purposes of this section, em-
ployment (including the usual and normal practices incident to employ-
ment) shall not be deemed to constitute harboring."54 For the time being,
we were not about to punish U.S. employers who might be benefiting from
the labor of low-wage, undocumented workers. "Beginning in 1971, legis-
lative proposals featuring employer sanctions as a centerpiece reappeared
and were touted as the tool needed to resolve the undocumented alien prob-
lem." 55  Resolving the "problem" of undocumented people essentially
meant forcing them to leave the country by denying them the ability to
work, and therefore to eat, pay rent, or support themselves and their fami-
lies. By the end of the Carter administration in 1980, the Select Commis-
sion on Immigration and Refugee Policy portrayed the legalization of
people already here as a necessary balance to sanctions, which, presuma-
bly, would discourage more undocumented people from coming in the fu-
ture.
56
Within thirty years of the 1952 rejection of employer sanctions, Con-
gress believed that most Americans were convinced that a crisis over undo-
cumented immigration-especially undocumented Mexican migration-
existed and that something had to be done.57 By 1986 federal employer
sanctions were enacted as the major feature of reform. By a bare swing
vote of only four members of the House of Representatives, legalization (or
amnesty) provisions were also made part of the package to address the un-
documented immigrant issue.
58
52. Susan Gzesh, Central Americans and Asylum Policy in the Reagan Era, MIGRATION
INFO. SOURCE (Apr. 1, 2006), http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=
384.
53. HiNG, DEFINING AMERICA, supra note 49, at 155.
54. Act of Mar. 20, 1952, Pub. L. No. 283, 66 Stat. 26.
55. HING, DEFINING AMERICA, supra note 49, at 156.
56. See id.
57. See Hing, Lessons for the Self-Help, supra note 48, at 475-76.
58. See id. at 480.
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Although on paper it appeared that a deal involving employer sanctions
for amnesty had been struck, there was not political trade-off; IRCA
would have gone forward if legalization were dropped by the House, and
its effective implementation in the hands of an inept Immigration and Na-
turalization Service was seriously in doubt.59
The efficacy of employer sanctions in reducing undocumented migration
is hotly debated. Proponents of increased enforcement note that few em-
ployers have been fined or punished since 1986. That view, however, fails
to note that hundreds of thousands of workers have been fired. In fact, pu-
nishing employers, or threatening to do so, was always simply a mechan-
ism to criminalize work for the workers themselves, and thereby force them
to leave the country, or not to come in the first place.
In addition to the many social and economic phenomena that historically
cause undocumented migration to the United States from Mexico, we now
know that NAFTA and the effects of globalization create great migration
pressures on Mexicans. 60 The push-pull factors are strong. As the Mex-
ican consul from Douglas, Arizona once noted, the border could be
"mined" and migrants would still attempt to cross.6 1 As Renee Saucedo
points out: "So long as we have trade agreements like NAFTA that create
poverty in countries like Mexico, people will continue to come here, no
matter how many walls we build., 62 Consider Ismael Rojas, who left his
family in Mexico many times over a twenty-five-year period to work in the
United States as an undocumented worker. In his words, "you can either
abandon your children to make money to take care of them, or you can stay
with your children and watch them live in misery. Poverty makes us leave
our families." 63 Utilizing employer sanctions to address the phenomenon
of Mexican migration in this context of poverty and globalization causes
misery for workers, but does not reduce migration. Arresting and deporting
workers for working without authorization as a means of discouraging
them from coming here for a better life simply cannot be effective in the
face of such grave economic and social forces. We also need to ask our-
selves whether we can really justify punishing workers who are here be-
cause of the effects of many U.S. economic policies.
59. HING, DEFINING AMERICA, supra note 49, at 156.
60. See generally BILL ONG HING, ETHICAL BORDERS: NAFTA, GLOBALIZATION, AND
MEXICAN MIGRATION (2010).
61. Interview with Jennifer Allen, Exec. Dir., Border Action Network, in Nogales, Ariz.
(June 15, 2007).
62. Interview with Renee Saucedo, Dir., San Francisco Day Labor Program, in S.F., Cal.
(May 3, 2010).
63. Ginger Thompson, Mexican Leader Visits U.S. With a Vision to Sell, N.Y. TIMEs,
Aug. 24, 2000, at A3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/24/world/mexican-
leader-visits-us-with-a-vision-to-sell.html.
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Another problem with employer sanctions is the discrimination that re-
sults. Long before the recent evaluation of the discriminatory effects of the
E-Verify program, 64 discrimination was rampant. In its final report to
Congress on employer sanctions in 1990, the Government Accounting Of-
fice estimated that of 4.6 million employers in the United States, 346,000
admitted applying IRCA's verification requirements only to job applicants
who had a "foreign" accent or appearance. 65 Another 430,000 employers
only hired applicants born in the United States or did not hire applicants
with temporary work documents in order to be cautious.
66
Direct and indirect recruitment of Mexican workers has continued in
spite of the implementation of employer sanctions legislation in 1986.67 In
2001, researchers continued to identify organized groups of farm labor con-
tractors who travel to Mexican cities and towns, where they offer loans and
work guarantees to convince potential farm workers to cross the border into
the United States.68 The process involves well-organized networks of con-
tractors and contractor agents representing major U.S. agricultural compa-
nies.69 The headhunters are themselves often Mexicans who recruit in their
own hometowns and farming communities where earning the trust of eager
farm hands is not difficult.70 One of the contractors' favorite tactics to at-
tract workers is to offer them loans to help pay off debts, coupled with a
pledge to find work for the person north of the border.7 1 Many U.S. com-
panies rely on these networks of recruiters.
72
Even a cursory review of the ICE raids in the past few years reveals an
obvious disparity in the targeting of undocumented workers over the em-
64. IMMIGR. POL'Y CTR., E-VERIFY AND ARIZONA: EARLY EXPERIENCES FOR EMPLOYERS,
EMPLOYEES, AND THE ECONOMY PORTEND A ROUGH ROAD AHEAD (May 2008), available at
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/AZE-verifyO 4 -08.pdf. E-Verify
is a federal, web-based program through which U.S. businesses can attempt to verify the
work authorization of new hires. See IMMIGR. POL'Y CTR., DECIPHERING THE NUMBERS ON
E-VERIFY ACCURACY (Feb. 11, 2009), available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/
default/files/docs/Deciphering%20the%20Numbers%20on%20E-Veify%20Accuracy.pdf
65. Michael Fix & Frank D. Bean, The Findings and Policy Implications of the GAO
Report and the Urban Institute Hiring Audit, 24 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 816 (1990).
66. Laura C. Oliveira, Comment, A License to Exploit: The Need to Reform the H-2A
Temporary Agricultural Guest Worker Program, 5 SCHOLAR 153, 170 (2002).
67. See supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
68. See Dan Herbeck, Family Charged With Keeping Workers in Illegal Conditions,
BUFFALO NEWS, June 19, 2002, http://blogs.buffalonews.com/inside-the news/2008/1 I/
brainstorming-w.html.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See MARY BAUER & SARAH REYNOLDS, S. POVERTY L. CTR., CLOSE TO SLAVERY:
GUESTWORKER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES (Mar. 2007), available at http://www.
sharedprosperity.org/splcenter.org.SPLCguestworker.pdf.
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ployers who hire them. Anyone who sympathizes with the undocumented
worker's position but feels that "the law is the law" must hold employers to
that same standard. That means demanding the enforcement of labor laws
against unscrupulous employers who take advantage of low-income work-
ers-documented or undocumented. All too often, the undocumented
workforce that has been paid less than minimum wage for work conditions
that violate health and safety standards is hauled away, and the employer
receives no punishment. Instead of deporting the workers, we should re-
move the barriers that stand in the way of their efforts to place pressure on
the employers to improve wage and work conditions. In the process, the
jobs may, in fact, become more attractive to native workers-something
that, ironically, anti-immigrant forces want.
In 2009, Ken Georgetti, president of the Canadian Labour Congress, and
John Sweeney, president of the AFL-CIO, wrote to President Obama and
Canadian Prime Minister Harper, reminding them that,
the failure of neoliberal policies to create decent jobs in the Mexican
economy under NAFTA has meant that many displaced workers and new
entrants have been forced into a desperate search to find employment
elsewhere.... We believe that all workers, regardless of immigration sta-
tus, should enjoy equal labor rights .... We also support an inclusive,
practical and swift adjustment of status program, which we believe would
have the effect of raising labor standards for all workers.73
While employer sanctions have little effect on migration, they have
made workers more vulnerable to employer pressure. Because working is
illegal for them, undocumented workers fear protesting low wages and bad
conditions.74 Employer sanctions bar them from receiving unemployment
and disability benefits, although they make payments for them.75 If they
get fired for complaining or organizing it's much harder to find another job.
Despite these obstacles, immigrant workers, including the undocumented,
have asserted their labor rights, organized unions, and won better condi-
tions. 76 But employer sanctions have made this harder and riskier.
73. Letter from Ken Georgetti, President, Canadian Labour Cong., and John Sweeney,
President, Am. Fed'n Labor and Cong. of Indus. Orgs., to Barack Obama, President, U.S.,
and Stephen Harper, Prime Minister, Can. (Feb. 18, 2009), available at http://www.boston.
com/news/politics/politicalintelligence/jjs%20kg%201etter/o2oto%20obama%20and%20har
per0/o20%20021809.pdf.
74. See Elise Foley, Workers Rebuilding New Orleans Face Rampant Wage Theft,
WASH. INDEP., Sept. 1, 2010, http://washingtonindependent.com/9641 1/workers-rebuilding-
new-orleans-face-rampant-wage-theft.
75. KEvIN R. JOHNSON ET AL., UNDERSTANDING IMMIGRATION LAW 444 (2009).
76. See Justin Akers Chac6n, Out From the Shadows, Into the Street: The New Immi-
grant Civil Rights Movement, 47 INT'L SOCIALIST REv. (2006), available at http://www.is
review.org/issues/47/newmovement.shtml.
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Using Social Security numbers to verify immigration status has led to
firing and blacklisting many union activists. 77 Even citizens and permanent
residents feel this impact, because in our diverse U.S. workplaces immi-
grant and native-born workers work together.78 Making it a crime for one
group to enforce the law or use their rights has simply created obstacles for
everyone else. Unions now have greater difficulty defending the rights of
their own members or organizing new ones. The exploitation of the undo-
cumented workforce will only end if workers are free to make complaints
and organize.
Eliminating the undocumented workforce without providing an avenue
for their labor to be utilized in the United States also would have devastat-
ing economic consequences. Data reveal many U.S. job categories that re-
ly on the undocumented workforce. 79 Gordon Hanson's findings for the
Council on Foreign Relations support these arguments. He notes that be-
tween 1960 and 2000 the number of U.S. residents with less than twelve
years of schooling fell from fifty percent to twelve percent.80
Arizona stands to see the negative effects of massive exclusion of an un-
documented workforce. Before the state's enactment of its "Legal Workers
Arizona Act" in 2007, the state experienced decades worth of growth,
boosted by its estimated twelve percent undocumented labor force.8' The
new law caused many headaches and loss of production for Arizona em-
ployers who need workers. 82 Also, we should not lose sight of the fact that
immigrants are consumers as well. Their consumption creates demand for
certain goods and services, which in turn creates jobs.83
77. David Bacon, Labor & Emp't Comm., Nat'l Lawyers Guild, Talking Points on
Guest Workers (July 6, 2005), available at http://www.nlg-laboremploy-comm.org/media/
documents/nlg-laboremploy-comm.org_77.pdf
78. National Commission on ICE Misconduct and Violation of 4th Amendment Rights
investigations of ICE raids reveal that citizens as well as immigrants were held in custody.
See NAT'L COMM'N ON ICE MISCONDUCT & VIOLATIONS OF 4TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS, RAIDS
ON WORKERS: DESTROYING OUR RIGHTS (2009), available at http://www.icemisconduct.org
/docUploads/UFCW%20CE%20rpt%20FINAL%20150B_061809_130632.pdfCFID=908
3458&CFTOKEN=87909032.
79. See BILL ONG HING, DEPORTING OUR SOULS: VALUES, MORALITY, AND IMMIGRATION
POLICY 12-14 (2006). The categories include construction, food preparation, grounds main-
tenance, agriculture work, janitorial work, housekeeping, and sewing.
80. Gordon H. Hanson, The Economic Logic of Illegal Immigration 14 (Council on For-
eign Rel., CSR No. 26, 2007).
81. Faye Bowers, Employers Risk Little in Hiring Illegal Labor, CHRISTIAN SC. MoNI-
TOR, Apr. 18, 2006, http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/041 8/pO IsO 1-usec.html.
82. Id.
83. BILL ONG HING, To BE AN AMERICAN: CULTURAL PLURALISM AND THE RHETORIC OF
ASSIMILATION 46 (1997).
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Il. UNION FOCUS-COINCIDENCE OR INTENTIONAL
President Obama says employer sanctions enforcement targets employ-
ers "who are using illegal workers in order to drive down wages-and of-
tentimes mistreat those workers. 84 An ICE Worksite Enforcement Advi-
sory claims "ICE ... investigates employers who employ force, threats or
coercion.., in order to keep the unauthorized alien workers from reporting
substandard wage or working conditions. 85 One has to wonder whether
firing or deporting workers who endure employer sanctions actually helps
to cure such conditions. Also, consider the workers whom ICE has been
targeting under the Obama approach. Workers at Smithfield were trying to
organize a union to improve conditions.86 Overhill Farms has a union.87
American Apparel pays better than most garment factories. 88 The ABM
workers in San Francisco, and another 1200 fired janitors in Minneapolis,
were union members who were receiving a higher wage than non-union
workers-and they had to strike to win it.89
ABM is one of the largest building service companies in the country,
and it appears that union janitorial companies are the targets of the Obama
administration's immigration enforcement program.9° A frustrated union
official points out that,
Homeland Security is going after employers that are unions .... They're
going after employers that give benefits and are paying above the average.
... What kind of economic recovery goes with firing thousands of work-
ers? Why don't they target employers who are not paying taxes, who are
not obeying safety or labor laws? 91
The 1200 fired janitors in Minneapolis belonged to SEIU Local 26, the 475
janitors in San Francisco were from Local 87, and 100 janitors working for
Seattle Building Maintenance fired in November 2009 belonged to Local
6.92
And despite Obama's contention that sanctions enforcement will punish
those employers who exploit immigrants, employers are rewarded for coo-
84. See Brandon, supra note 8.
85. Worksite Enforcement, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMs ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.
gov/worksite/index.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2010).
86. Steven Greenhouse, Smithfield's NC. Plant Struggles to Replace Illegal Workers,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 13, 2007, http://hamptonroads.com/node/344851.
87. See Lee Sustar, Immigrant Labor Under Attack, SOCIALISTWORKER.ORG (Sept. 11,
2009), http://socialistworker.org/2009/09/1 1/immigrant-labor-under-attack.
88. See Johnson, supra note 33.
89. See Aslanian, supra note 31.
90. See supra notes 27, 31 and accompanying text.
91. Interview with Olga Miranda, supra note 42.
92. Id.
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perating with ICE by being immunized from prosecution. 93 Javier Murillo,
president of SEIU Local 26, says, "[t]he promise made during the audit is
that if the company cooperates and complies, they won't be fined. So this
kind of enforcement really only hurts workers."
94
Workers fired at Overhill Farms accuse the company of hiring replace-
ments, classified as "part timers," who do not receive the benefits in the un-
ion contract.95 By firing regular workers who were being paid benefits, the
company was able to save "a lot of money."96
The history of workplace immigration enforcement is filled with exam-
ples of employers who use audits and discrepancies as pretexts to discharge
union militants or discourage worker organization. The sixteen-year union
drive at the Smithfield pork plant in North Carolina, for instance, saw a
raid, and the firing of fifty workers for bad Social Security numbers.
97
ICE's campaign of audits and firings, which SEIU Local 26's Murillo calls
"the Obama enforcement policy," targets the same set of employers the
Bush raids went after-union companies or those with organizing drives.
98
If anything, ICE seems intent on punishing undocumented workers who
earn too much, or become too visible by demanding higher wages and or-
ganizing unions.
This growing wave of firings is provoking sharp debate in unions, espe-
cially those with large immigrant memberships. Many of the food
processing workers at Overhill Farms and ABM's janitors have been dues-
paying members for years. They expect the union to defend them when the
company fires them for lack of status. "The union should try to stop people
from losing their jobs," protests Erlinda Silerio, an Overhill Farms worker.
"It should try to get the company to hire us back, and pay compensation for
the time we've been out."99 At American Apparel, although there was no
union, some workers had actively tried to form one in past years.1 0 0 Jose
Covarrubias got a job as a cleaner when the garment union was helping
them organize.' 0 ' "I'd worked with the International Ladies' Garment
93. Interview with Javier Murillo, President, SEIU Local 26, in S.F., Cal. (May 3,
2010).
94. Id.
95. Interview with Lucia Vasquez, in L.A., Cal. (Dec. 10, 2009).
96. Id. An Overhill spokesman claimed that the replacements are paid at the same rate,
although he acknowledged they lack benefits. Interview with Alex Auerbach, supra note
47.
97. Julia Preston, Immigration Raid Draws Protest From Labor Officials, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 26, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/26/us/26immig.html.
98. Interview with Javier Murillo, supra note 93.
99. Interview with Erlinda Silerio, in L.A., Cal. (June 18, 2009).
100. Interview with Jose Covarrubias, in L.A., Cal. (Dec. 16, 2009).
101. Id.
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Workers and the Garment Workers Center before," he recalls, "in sweat-
shops where we sued the owners when they disappeared without paying us.
When I got to American Apparel I joined right away. I debated with the
non-union workers, trying to convince them the union would defend us."' 0 2
The Obama approach ends up promoting a guest worker program akin to
his predecessor's vision. As we have seen, at Gebbers Farms, there really
were no takers among the native work force, and guest workers were
brought in. 10 3 Remarks by President Bush's DHS Secretary Michael Cher-
toff in 2008 were revealing: "[T]here's [an] obvious[] . . . solution to the
problem of illegal work, which is you open the front door and you shut the
back door .... 104 "Opening the front door" allows employers to recruit
workers to come to the United States, giving them visas that tie their ability
to stay to their employment. And to force workers to come through this
system, "closing the back door" criminalizes migrants who work without
"work authorization."'10 5 As Arizona Governor, DHS Secretary Janet Na-
politano supported this arrangement, signing the state's own draconian em-
ployer sanctions bill, while supporting guest worker programs.'06
In its final proposal to "shut the back door," the Bush administration an-
nounced a regulation requiring employers to fire any worker whose Social
Security number did not match the Social Security Administration's data-
base. 107 Social Security no-match letters do not currently require employ-
ers to fire workers with mismatched numbers, although employers have
nevertheless used them to terminate thousands of people. 10 8 President
Bush would have made such terminations mandatory.
Unions, the ACLU, and the National Immigration Law Center got an in-
junction to stop the rule's implementation in the summer of 2007, arguing
it would harm citizens and legal residents who might be victims of clerical
mistakes.'0 9 In July 2009, the Obama administration decided not to contest
102. Id.
103. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
104. See Chertoff, supra note 41.
105. Id.
106. See Matthew Benson, Napolitano Signs Immigrant Bill Targeting Employers, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, July 2, 2007.
107. See Jacqueline McManus, No-Match Letters From the Feds, MONTEREY CouNTY
HERALD, July 23, 2010.
108. Id.
109. See Memorandum from Alan Berkowitz and Carolyn Hall, Bingham McCutchen
LLP, Federal Judge Enjoins Implementation of Homeland Security's "No-Match Letter"
Regulation (Oct. 12, 2007), available at http://www.bingham.com/Media.aspx?MedialD=
5959.
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the injunction. 10 But while dropping Bush's regulation, DHS announced it
would beef up the use of the E-Verify electronic database, arguing that it's
more efficient in targeting the undocumented."1 '
Social Security, however, continues to send no-match letters to employ-
ers, and the E-Verify database is compiled, in part, by sifting through So-
cial Security numbers, looking for mismatches. 112 DHS Secretary Janet
Napolitano called on employers to screen new hires using E-Verify, and
said those who do so will be entitled to put a special logo on their products
stating "I E-Verify." '113 And although the final regulations never took ef-
fect, DHS says an employer's failure to adequately follow up on a no-
match letter can constitute evidence of or contribute to an employer's
knowledge of an employee's unauthorized status. 
114
The twelve million undocumented people in the United States, spread in
factories, fields, and construction sites throughout the country, encompass
lots of workers. Many are aware of their rights and anxious to improve
their lives. National union organizing campaigns, like Justice for Janitors
and Hotel Workers Rising, depend on the determination and activism of
these immigrants, documented and undocumented alike. That reality final-
ly convinced the AFL-CIO in 1999 to reject the federation's former support
for employer sanctions and call for repeal.1 15 Unions recognized that sanc-
tions enforcement makes it much more difficult for workers to defend their
rights, organize unions, and raise wages. 
116
Opposing sanctions, however, puts labor in opposition to the current
administration, which it helped elect. Some Washington D.C. lobbying
groups have decided to support the administration policy of sanctions en-
forcement instead. One of them, Reform Immigration for America, says,
"any employment verification system should determine employment autho-
110. See Memorandum from Kate Kalmykov, Klasko, Rulon, Stock & Seltzer, LLP, DHS
Does Away With the Social Security No-Match Rule in Favor of E-Verify (July 16, 2009),
available at http://blog.klaskolaw.com/2009/07/16/dhs-does-away-with-the-social-security-
no-match-rule-in-favor-of-e-verify/.
11. Id.
112. McManus, supra note 107.
113. Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, Secretary Napolitano, ICE Assis-
tant Secretary Morton and USCIS Director Mayorkas Announce New Campaign to Recog-
nize Employers Committed to Maintaining a Legal Workforce (Nov. 19, 2009), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/prl258640944663.shtm.
114. See McManus, supra note 107; see also 8 C.F.R. § 274a (2010).
115. David Bacon, Justice Deported: Tuesday's Immigration Raids on Meatpacking
Plants Weren't About Curbing Identity Theft, They Were About Union-Busting, AM. PROS-
PECT, Dec. 14, 2006, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?articleld = 12297.
116. Id.
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rization accurately and efficiently."'1 17 Verification of authorization is ex-
actly what happened at American Apparel and ABM, and inevitably leads
to firings." 8 The AFL-CIO and the Change to Win labor federation this
spring also agreed on a new immigration position that supports a "secure
and effective worker authorization mechanism ... one that determines em-
ployment authorization accurately while providing maximum protection for
workers." 119
Jose Covarrubias,12 0 one of the fired American Apparel workers, is left
defenseless by such protection, however. Instead, he says, "we need the
unity of workers. There are 15 million people in the AFL-CIO. They have
a lot of economic and political power. Why don't they oppose these firings
and defend us?" he asks. 121 "We've contributed to this movement for 20
years, and we're not leaving. We're going to stay and fight for a more just
immigration reform."'' 22
IV. INSTITUTIONALIZED RACISM
Anyone who is opposed to racial profiling and racially discriminatory
enforcement of laws should be concerned about the Obama employer sanc-
tions enforcement strategy. As in the case of the Bush-style ICE raids, the
Obama audit-style approach that has resulted in layoffs of thousands of
workers has preyed almost exclusively on Latino workers.' 23  The racial
effects should not be facilely cast aside.
As we have argued elsewhere, racism against Latinos has been institu-
tionalized in the enforcement of U.S. immigration laws. 124 In contempo-
rary terms and within the black-white paradigm in the United States, insti-
tutional racism is understood to have resulted from the social caste system
that sustained, and was sustained by, slavery and racial segregation. Al-
though the laws that enforced this caste system are no longer in place, one
can argue that its basic structure still stands to this day. So today, one
117. About Reform Immigration for America, CAMPAIGN TO REFORM IMMIGR. FOR AM.,
http://reformimmigrationforamerica.org/blog/about/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2010).
118. See supra notes 1-4, 24-31 and accompanying text.
119. Press Release, Change to Win, Change to Win and AFL-CIO Unveil Unified Immi-
gration Reform Framework (Apr. 14, 2009), available at http://www.changetowin.org/for-
the-media/press-releases-and-statements/change-to-win-and-afl-cio-unveil-unified-
immigration-reform-framework.html.
120. Interview with Jose Covarrubias, supra note 100.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Interview with Isela Hernandez, supra note 46; Interview with Olga Martinez, supra
note 42; Interview with Renee Saucedo, supra note 62.
124. See generally Hing, supra note 11.
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might claim that institutionalized racism deprives a racially identified
group, usually defined as generally inferior to the defining dominant group,
equal access to education, medical care, law, politics, housing, and the
like. 1
25
"By understanding the fundamental principles of institutionalized racism
we begin to see the application of the concept beyond the conventional
black-white paradigm."' 126 Institutional racism embodies discriminating
against certain groups of people through the use of biased laws or practic-
es. 127 Structures and social arrangements become accepted, and they oper-
ate and are manipulated in such a way as to support or acquiesce in acts of
racism. Institutional racism can be subtle and less visible, but is no less de-
structive to human life and human dignity than individual acts of racism. 128
The forces of racism have become embodied in U.S. immigration
laws. 129 As these laws are enforced, they are accepted as common practice,
in spite of their racial effects. We may not like particular laws or enforce-
ment policies because of their harshness or their violations of human digni-
ty or civil rights, but many of us do not sense the inherent racism because
we are not cognizant of the dominant racial framework. "Understanding
the evolution of U.S. immigration laws and enforcement provides us with a
better awareness of [what is happening and] the institutional racism that
controls those policies."' 130
Rightly or wrongly, today the so-called "illegal immigration" problem
has become synonymous with the control, or lack thereof, of the southwest
border. "As such, the 'problem' is synonymous with Mexican migration,
and Mexican immigrants have come to be regarded by many anti-
125. Id. at 323.
126. Id.
127. See generally Rachel F. Moran, Whatever Happened to Racism, 79 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 899 (2005).
128. Id.
129. Kevin Johnson has recognized:
There is no better body of law to illustrate the close nexus between race and class
than U.S. immigration law and its enforcement. At bottom, U.S. immigration law
historically has operated-and continues to operate-to prevent many poor and
working noncitizens of color from migrating to, and harshly treating those living
in, the United States. The laws are nothing less than a "magic mirror" into the na-
tion's collective consciousness about its perceived national identity-an identity
that marginalizes poor and working immigrants of color and denies them full
membership in American social life.
Kevin R. Johnson, The Intersection of Race and Class in U.S. Immigration Law and En-
forcement, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1,2 (2009).
130. Hing, supra note 11, at 324.
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immigrant voices as the enemy."'131 The anti-immigrant activists do not re-
gard themselves as racist; they view themselves as the voice for law and
order. 32 "The history of the border, labor recruitment and border enforce-
ment explains how the institutionalization of anti-Mexican immigration
policies has created the structure to allow these voices to claim racial and
ethnic neutrality and for many Americans accept that claim."
' 133
The current numerical limitation system, while not explicitly racist, op-
erates in a manner that severely restricts immigration from Mexico and the
high-visa-demand countries of Asia. The 1965 amendments represented a
welcome change, but the new law was no panacea. 134 President John F.
Kennedy originally had proposed a large pool of immigration visas to be
doled out on a first-come, first-serve system without country quotas.' 35 If
implemented, the system immediately would have facilitated the entry of
large numbers of Asian immigrants, because a first-come, first-serve sys-
tem would benefit countries with the biggest demand. After JFK's assassi-
nation, his brother, Ted, and President Lyndon Johnson continued to pro-
mote the legislation.' 36 However, JFK's egalitarian vision did not survive
the political process. Instead, a system that included per country caps of
approximately 20,000 visas for each country outside the Western Hemis-
phere was established in the 1965 immigration act, with only 200 visas
available for territories such as Hong Kong. 137 An Eastern Hemisphere
numerical limitation of 170,000 visas was established. 1
38
Between 1965 and 1976, while the rest of the world enjoyed an expan-
sion of numerical limitations and a definite preference system, Mexico and
other countries of the Western Hemisphere were suddenly faced with nu-
merical limitations for the first time. These countries had to share a quota
of 120,000. The system was first-come, first-serve system, with Mexico
taking a big share of the 120,000, more than 40,000 each year because of
its high visa demands.' 39 Applicants had to meet strict labor certification
requirements, but waivers were available to certain applicants like parents
131. Id. at 326; see also Douglas S. Massey, Backfire at the Border: Why Enforcement
Without Legalization Cannot Stop Illegal Immigration (Ctr. for Trade Pol'y Stud., Cato
Inst., Trade Pol'y Analysis No. 29, 2006).
132. About FAIR, FED'N FOR AM. IMMIGR. REFORM, http://www.fairus.org/site/Page
Navigator/about (last visited Oct. 24, 2010).
133. Hing, supra note 11, at 325.
134. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (Hart-Celler Act), Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79
Stat. 911.
135. HING, DEFINING AMERICA, supra note 49, at 93-98.
136. Id.
137. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(c) (2006).
138. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (2006).
139. Silva v. Bell, 605 F.2d 978, 980-82 (7th Cir. 1979).
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of U.S. citizen children; many Mexicans qualified for that waiver. 140 As
one might expect, given the new numerical limitations but large visa de-
mands, by 1976 the Western Hemisphere system resulted in a severe back-
log of approximately three years and a waiting list with nearly 300,000
names. 141
As the framework resulted in growing visa backlogs for Western Hemis-
phere countries, things got worse in 1977. Congress altered the Western
Hemisphere system yet again, imposing the same preference system and a
20,000 visa per country numerical limitation that the rest of the world first
confronted in 1965.142 Thus, Mexico's annual visa usage rate (more than
40,000) was virtually sliced in half overnight, and thousands were left
stranded on the old system's waiting list.
143
Today's selection system simply does not have room for many relatives
because of numerical limitations or those who are simply displaced work-
ers. They do not qualify for special visas set aside for professionals and
management employees of multi-national corporations or those visas that
require substantial funds for investment. 144 Similarly, the system has no
slot for anyone whose livelihood is controlled by trade agreements and glo-
balization that cause job loss in low-income regions, as multi-national cor-
porations, the beneficiaries of free trade, relocate to other sites where their
production costs are cheaper.
The system results in severe backlogs in certain family immigration cat-
egories-particularly for spouses, unmarried sons and daughters of lawful
permanent residents, and siblings of U.S. citizens. For some countries,
such as the Philippines and Mexico, the waiting periods for certain catego-
ries are ten to twenty years! 145 Given the severe backlogs and the continu-
ing allure of the United States (not simply in terms of economic opportuni-
ties, but because relatives are already here due to recruitment efforts or
political stability), many would-be immigrants are left with little choice.
Inevitably they explore other ways of entering the United States without
waiting. By doing so, they fall into the jaws of the immigration exclusion
laws that provide civil and criminal penalties for circumventing the proper
immigration procedures.
140. Id.
141. HING, DEFINING AMERICA, supra note 49, at 97-100.
142. Act of Oct. 20, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, 90 Stat. 2703.
143. Silva, 605 F.2d at 980-82.
144. 8 U.S.C. §§ l101(a)(15), 1153(b)(5), (c) (2006).
145. See U.S. Dep't of State, Visa Bulletin, TRAVEL.STATE.Gov, http://travel.state.gov/
visa/bulletin/bulletin_1360.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2010).
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The basic civil sanction of removal (deportation) applies to individuals
who fall into the immigration trap of following their instincts to reunite
with families or to seek economic opportunities. The categories of deport-
able aliens include the following persons: those who are in the United
States in violation of the immigration laws (e.g., entry without inspection,
false claim to citizenship); those non-immigrants who overstay their visas
or work without authorization; those who have helped others enter (smug-
gled) without inspection; and, those who are parties to sham marriages. 4 6
Additional civil penalties, including fines, can be imposed for forging or
counterfeiting an immigration document, failing to depart pursuant to a re-
moval order, entering without inspection, and entering into a sham mar-
riage. 147
Congress also has enacted criminal provisions that go far beyond the
civil sanction of removal and monetary fines for many of these actions.
For example, the following acts are criminalized (subject to imprisonment
and/or monetary fines): falsifying registration information about the family;
any bringing in (smuggling), transporting, or harboring (within the United
States) of an undocumented alien (including family members); entry with-
out inspection or through misrepresentation; the reentry of an alien (with-
out permission) who previously has been removed or denied admission;
and, making a false claim of U.S. citizenship.
148
So given insufficient supply of immigrant visas to satisfy the demands
for family reunification, and no supply for simple, displaced working class
workers, the action of traveling to the United States by circumventing the
current structure can easily result in civil and, at times, criminal liability.
The migrants who fall into those groups are from the countries whose fami-
ly immigration quotas are oversubscribed or whose economy has been
damaged by globalization and free trade. Those countries are primarily
Asian and Latin.
It does not take long to realize that while immigration laws and en-
forcement policies have evolved in a manner that continues to prey on
Mexicans, Asians, and other Latin migrants, the relationship of those laws
and policies with other racialized institutions underscores the structural
challenges that immigrants of color face. Consider NAFTA and the World
Trade Organization. For example, NAFTA has placed Mexico at such a
competitive disadvantage with the United States in the production of corn
that Mexico now imports most of its corn from the United States, and Mex-
146. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a), 1324(c)-(d), 1325(b)-(c), 1326; see also JOHNSON ET AL., supra
note 75, at 314-20.
147. See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 75, at 231-33, 407-12.
148. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1306(b)-(c), 1324(a), 1325(b), 1326; 18 U.S.C. §§ 911, 1015.
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ican corn farm workers have lost their jobs. 149 The U.S.-embraced World
Trade Organization, which advocates global free trade, favors lowest-bid
manufacturing nations like China and India, so that manufacturers in a
country like Mexico cannot compete and must lay off workers.150 Is there
little wonder that so many Mexican workers look to the United States for
jobs, especially when so many of the multi-national corporations and com-
panies that benefit from free trade are headquartered here?
Think also of refugee resettlement programs as an institution. "When
Southeast Asian refugees are resettled in public housing or poor neighbor-
hoods, their children find themselves in an environment that can lead to bad
behavior or crime.'"151 Refugee parents, like other working class immigrant
parents, often work long hours and their children are left unsupervised.
152
And consider U.S. involvement in wars and civil conflict abroad. The in-
stitution of war itself produces refugees. U.S. participation in civil conflict
in countries like Guatemala and El Salvador produced refugees in the
1980s.'15  But think also of U.S. involvement in places like southeast
Asia, 154 and now Afghanistan and Iraq, that also has produced involuntary
migrants of color to our shores.'
55
Other racialized institutions that interact with immigration laws and en-
forcement also come to mind: think of the criminal justice system, poor
neighborhoods, and inner city schools. Even coming back full circle to en-
slavement of people-today's human trafficking institutions-we begin to
realize a sad interaction with immigration laws that require greater atten-
tion. These institutions can all lead to situations that spell trouble within
the immigration enforcement framework.
Thus, the immigration admission and enforcement regimes may appear
neutral on their face, but they have evolved in a racialized manner,1 56 and
when the immigration framework interacts with other institutions such as
the criminal justice system, NAFTA, globalization, poor neighborhoods,
149. HING, supra note 60; Bill Ong Hing, NAFTA, Globalization, and Mexican Migrants,
5 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 87 (2009).
150. HING, supra note 60, at 94-95.
151. Hing, supra note 11, at 347; see also Bill Ong Hing, Detention to Deportation: Re-
thinking the Removal of Cambodian Refugees, 38 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 891, 939-49 (2005)
[hereinafter Hing, Deportation to Detention]; Duc Ta, We All Make Mistakes: One Day 171
Be Free Thirty-Five Years to Life, 31 AMERASIA J. 113-20 (2005).
152. Hing, Detention to Deportation, supra note 151, 939-49.
153. Gzesh, supra note 52.
154. BILL ONG HING, MAKING AND REMAKING ASIAN AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION
POLICY, 1850-1990, at 121-38 (1993).
155. Iraq, Afghan Refugees Start Over in US, MILITARY.COM (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.
military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,202225,00.html.
156. See supra notes 123-155 and accompanying text.
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and schools in which many immigrants and refugees are situated, you real-
ize that the structure generates racial group disparities as well.5 7 NAFTA
and globalization provide a major reason why many migrants of color can-
not remain in their native countries if they are to provide for their families.
The criminal justice system and poverty prey heavily on poor communities
of color, leading to deportable offenses if defendants are not U.S. citi-
zens. 
15 8
The construction of the U.S. immigration policy and enforcement regime
has resulted in a framework that victimizes Latin and Asian immigrants. 159
These immigrants of color ended up being the subject of ICE raids during
the Bush administration. 6 ° They are the ones who comprise the immigra-
tion visa backlogs. They are the ones that attempt to traverse the hostile
southwest border. Today, Latino and Latina workers are the primary vic-
tims of the Obama audit strategy. 6'
Their victimization has been institutionalized. Thus, any complaint
about immigrants-fiscal or social-can be voiced in non-racial, rule-of-
law terms because the institution has masked the racialization with laws
and operations that are couched in non-racial terms. Anti-immigrant pun-
dits are shielded from charges of racism by labeling their targets "law
breakers" or "unassimilable." Deportation, detention, and exclusion at the
border can be declared race-neutral by the DHS because the system already
has been molded by decades of racialized refinement. Officials are simply
"enforcing the laws." The victimization of Latinos by immigration laws
and enforcement policies has been normalized, allowing Americans to ac-
cept statistics about disproportionality (just as they have with respect to ra-
cial inequities in, for example, the educational or criminal justice systems)
as "just the way things are." 162 Like white privilege, institutionalized rac-
ism generally goes unrecognized by those who are not negatively im-
pacted. 1
63
157. See generally HING, supra note 60.
158. See generally Hing, Detention to Deportation, supra note 151.
159. See supra notes 123-155 and accompanying text.
160. See generally Hing, supra note 11.
161. See supra notes 95-123 and accompanying text.
162. Anne C. Kubisch, Why Structural Racism? Why a Structural Racism Caucus?, PO-
VERTY & RACE RES. ACTION COUNCIL, Nov./Dec. 2006, available at http://www.prrac.org/
full text.php?textid=1094&item id=1 0187&newsletter-id=90&header-Symposium:%20S
tructural%20Racism.
163. Sylvia Law puts it this way:
[W]hile white people benefit from white privilege, it is systemic and invisible, and
not a matter of individual wrong doing or guilt. I am not guilty of racism because
a cab picks me up. I do not discriminate when cops don't stop me for no reason,
and then let me talk them out of a ticket. I am not a racist because my daddy got a
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We should know better. The cards are stacked against Latin migrants-
especially Mexicans. The immigration law and enforcement traps are set
through a militarized border practice and an anachronistic visa system. It's
no surprise that Mexican immigrants are the victims of those traps. They
have been set up by the vestiges of a border history of labor recruitment
like the Bracero Program, Supreme Court deference to enforcement, and
border militarization that laid the groundwork for current laws and en-
forcement policies. 164 The resulting practice can be implemented through
seemingly non-racial provisions and operations that actually result in se-
vere racist outcomes.
CONCLUSION
Wanting more blood, some on the right complain that the Obama em-
ployer sanctions "silent raid" approach is too soft, because although the
workers get fired, they do not get deported. 165 They claim that "there is no
drama, no trauma, no families being torn apart, no handcuffs."' 166 No trau-
ma? Consider the fired San Francisco janitors who faced an agonizing di-
lemma. Should they turn themselves in to Homeland Security, who might
charge them with providing a bad Social Security number to their employ-
er, hold them for deportation, and even send them to prison, as was done
with workers in Iowa and Howard Industries in Mississippi? 167 For work-
ers with families, homes and deep roots in a community, it simply is not
possible to just walk away and disappear. As SEIU Local 87 president, O1-
ga Miranda, points out: "I have a lot of members who are single mothers
whose children were born here. I have a member whose child has leuke-
mia. What are they supposed to do? Leave their children here and go back
to Mexico and wait? And wait for what?"'
168
Union leaders like Miranda see a conflict between the rhetoric used by
the President and other Washington D.C. politicians and lobbyists in con-
good VA mortgage that parleyed into good housing for the rest of our lives. That
is not the point. Like it or not, we white people do benefit from white privilege.
And most of the time we do not even notice it.
Sylvia A. Law, White Privilege and Affirmative Action, 32 AKRON L. REv. 603, 616 (1999).
164. See H1NG, DEFINING AMERICA, supra note 49, 99-100, 126-31,139-44.
165. See Preston, supra note 19 (citing Sen. Jeff Sessions) ("This lax approach is particu-
larly troubling... at a time when so many American citizens are struggling to find jobs.").
166. Id. (citing Mark Reed, president of Border Management Strategies, a national con-
sulting firm based in Tucson that advises companies across the country on immigration
law).
167. See, e.g., Lynda Waddington, Raids on Swift, Agriprocessors Highlighted in Immi-
gration Policy Critique, IOWA INDEP., June 22, 2009, http://iowaindependent.com/16282/
raids-on-agriprocessors-swift-highlighted-in-new-immigration-policy-critique.
168. Interview with Olga Miranda, supra note 42.
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demning the Arizona law, and the immigration proposals they make in
Congress. "There's a huge contradiction here," she says. 169 "You can't tell
one state that what they're doing is criminalizing people, and at the same
time go after employers paying more than a living wage and the workers
who have fought for that wage."170
Renee Saucedo, attorney for La Raza Centro Legal and former director
of the San Francisco Day Labor Program, is even more critical. "Those
bills in Congress, which are presented as ones that will help some people
get legal status, will actually make things much worse. We'll see many
more firings like the janitors here, and more punishments for people who
are just working and trying to support their families."' 71
Nevertheless, whether or not they are motivated by economic gain or an-
ti-union animus, the current firings highlight larger questions of immigra-
tion enforcement policy. Nativo L6pez, director of the Hermandad Mex-
icana Latinoamericana, a grassroots organizer who organized protests
against the firings at Overhill Farms and American Apparel, puts it this
way:
These workers have not only done nothing wrong, they've spent years
making the company rich. No one ever called company profits illegal, or
says they should give them back to the workers. So why are the workers
called illegal? Any immigration policy that says these workers have no
right to work and feed their families is wrong and needs to be changed. 172
Whatever President Obama or Secretary Napolitano may claim about
punishing exploitative employers, employers who cooperate with the audit
initiative seem to evade sanctions. 173 ICE threatened to fine Dov Charney,
American Apparel's owner, but then withdrew the threat. 174 As a result,
it's the fired workers who are punished, as the employers escape fines in
exchange for cooperation.175
And the justification for hurting workers is also implicit in the policy
announced on the White House website, "remove incentives to enter the
country illegally."' 176 This was the original justification for employer sanc-
tions in 1986-if migrants cannot work, they will not come. Of course,
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Interview of Renee Saucedo, supra note 62.
172. Interview with Nativo L6pez, Dir., Hermandad Mexicana Latinoamericana, in L.A.,
Cal. (June 18, 2009).
173. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
174. See Interview with Peter Schey, in L.A., Cal. (Dec. 16, 2009).
175. See Interview with Javier Murillo, supra note 93.
176. See Immigration, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
[Vol. XXXVIII
EMPLOYER SANCTIONS
people did come, because at the same time Congress passed IRCA,' 7 7 it al-
so began to debate NAFTA. That virtually guaranteed future migration.
Since NAFTA went into effect in 1994, millions of Mexicans have been
driven by poverty across the border. 7 8 The real questions we need to ask
are what uproots people in Mexico, and why U.S. employers rely so heavi-
ly on low-wage workers.
Arguably, no one in the Obama or Bush administrations, or the Clinton
administration before them, wants to stop migration to the United States or
imagines that this could be done without catastrophic consequences. The
very industries they target for enforcement are so dependent on the labor of
migrants they would collapse without it.1 79 Instead, immigration policy
and enforcement consigns those migrants to an "illegal" status, and under-
mines the price of their labor. Enforcement is a means for managing the
flow of migrants and making their labor available to employers at a price
they want to pay.
In 1998, the Clinton administration mounted the largest sanctions en-
forcement action to date, in which agents sifted through the names of
24,310 workers in forty Nebraska meatpacking plants. 180 They then sent
letters to 4762 workers, saying their documents were bad, and over 3500
were forced from their jobs. 8 ' Mark Reed, who directed "Operation Van-
guard," claimed it was really intended to pressure Congress and employer
groups to support guest worker legislation. 182 "We depend on foreign la-
bor," he declared. "If we don't have illegal immigration anymore, we'll
have the political support for guest workers."' 183
Increased ICE raids, stepped up border enforcement, and employer sanc-
tions have not reduced undocumented immigration to the United States.'
84
The failure of these harsh efforts must teach us something. The enforce-
ment-only approach has resulted in human tragedy, increased poverty, and
family separation, while undocumented workers continue to flow into the
177. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a et seq.).
178. See generally HING, ETHICAL BORDERS, supra note 60.
179. Ricardo Sanchez, Bush s Immigration Proposal Keeps Industry in Cheap Labor,
SEATTLEPI.COM (Jan. 30, 2004), http://www.seattlepi.com/opinion/158609_ricardo30.html.
180. David Bacon, The Political Economy of immigration: Reform the Corporate Cam-
paign for a U.S. Guest Worker Program, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR (Nov. 2004), available
at http://multinationalmonitor.org/mm2004/112004/bacon.html.
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184. See HING, supra note 60, at 116-32.
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United States.' 85 This is a challenge that requires us to understand why
workers come here and to address the challenge in a more sensible manner.
The inhumanity of the situation is apparent to many. As Tom Barry puts
it,
we are wasting billions of dollars at home in what has become a war on
immigrants. The collateral costs of this anti-immigrant crackdown-
including labor shortages, families tom apart by deportations, over-
crowded jails and detentions centers, deaths on the border, courts clogged
with immigration cases, and divided communities-are also immense. 186
And the New York Times mourns that after we get through this period of
the "Great Immigration Panic,"' 87
someday, the country will recognize the true cost of its war on illegal im-
migration. We don't mean dollars, though those are being squandered by
the billions. The true cost is to the national identity: the sense of who we
are and what we value. It will hit us once the enforcement fever breaks,
when we look at what has been done and no longer recognize the country
that did it.
188
It's time to come to our senses and realize that the enforcement plus
guest worker approach has failed. The rise of employer sanctions enforce-
ment causes hardship for our fellow human travelers who only seek an op-
portunity to work to feed their families at an honest day's wage. While
employer sanctions enforcement has risen, we pray for its fall. Undocu-
mented migration is the result of factors and phenomena way beyond the
control of intimidation, guns, and militarization. The time to get smart has
arrived; we must begin considering more creative approaches by under-
standing the forces at work.18 9
Our current policies produce displaced people in Mexico, criminalize
them once they arrive in the United States, and view them simply as a
source of cheap labor for employers. We need to see migrants as human
beings first and then formulate a policy to protect their human and labor
185. See id.; see also HING, DEFINING AMERICA, supra note 49, at 184-205.
186. See Tom Barry, Paying the Price of the Immigration Crackdown, AMERICA LATINA
EN MOVMIENTO, May 23, 2008, http://alainet.org/active/24228&lang=es.
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com/2008/06/03/opinion/03tuel .html.
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compete with United States and Canadian companies, creating immigrant enterprise zones
for certain parts of the United States, broadening the permanent visa system to allow more
needed workers from Mexico to lawfully immigrate, and investing heavily in Mexico's in-
frastructure so that more jobs are created in Mexico. See HING, supra note 60, at 133-59.
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rights, along with those of other working people in this country. Repealing
employer sanctions is critical in moving us in that direction.
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